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AMERICAN FARMERS have experienced periodic
financial difficulties for many years. Frequently the
market-not the actions of individual producers-has
been the source of these difficulties. As a result, attaining adequate farm prices and incomes and maintaining
them has become· an important public policy issue.
The purpose of this paper is to briefly review the need
for price and income support programs, to characterize
and evaluate the federal government's response to this
need, and to outline the issues likely to affect future
programs. The primary focus will be on "commodity
programs," although selected broader policy options
will be briefly analyzed.

Nature of the Problem
Understanding economic problems in American agriculture is not an easy task. For one thing, observers frequently confuse the symptoms of these problems with
their causes. The result of such confusi on is policies
which do not alleviate "problems ." Another difficulty
is that economic problems vary over time, by size of
operation, by enterprise combination, and among
regions. No single solution will solve all problems.
Despite these difficulties, government assistance for
farmers is best understood through two characteristics
of production agriculture: I) a chronic excess capacity
for production which results in both low farm incomes
and low cash returns to capital committed to farming;
and 2) instability of production, prices, and income.
Excess Capacity-The average disposable income per
capita of the farm population has consistently lagged
behind that earned by the nonfarm population. The
only exceptions in the past 50 years were in 1973 and
1979. However, the ratio of farm to nonfarm incomes
has improved over the years. In the 1930's, the average
income of farm families averaged less than 40 percent of
nonfarm families. It rose above 50 percent in the 1950's,
reaching 70 percent for the first time in 1966, and 80
percent in 1972. Between 1973 and 1981 the ratio of
farm to nonfarm incomes varied between 77 and 104
percent.
Part of the improvement is the result of farm families

earning more of their income from off-farm sources. In
fact, off-farm income grew from 40 percent of total
farm family income in 1960 to 60 percent in the early
1980's.
Farm incomes represent a return on unpaid labor,
management, and equity in land and equipment. But
another way to analyze the financial well-being of
farmers is to consider the return to individual resources.
Since 1960, for example, current earnings on farm
equity capital have averaged about 4 percent per year.
However, when current earnings and capital gains on
equity capital are combined , the overall rate of return
on capital more than doubles. These total returns on
farm equity capital compare favorably to similarly combined returns on common stocks and on government
and corporate bonds during the 1960-1981 period.
Instability-Farmers are frequently confronted by instability in production, prices, and income. This instability is caused by a number of factors including
general economic conditions, weather, political decisions, and plant and animal diseases. Moreover the
quantity of farm products demanded is only slightly influenced by prices . This adds to instability problems, as
does the highly competitive structure of farming, which
denies individual farmers an opportunity to "balance"
supply with demand.
In the recent ten years between 1973 and 1982, aggregate net farm income in the United States varied from
$18 to 33 billion in current dollar terms. In constant
dollars, the variation was even more extreme. After
reaching $25 billion in 1973 (1967 dollars), real income
declined four straight years to $10 billion in 1977. After
regaining some lost ground in 1978-79, incomes
sl umped severely to even lower levels in 1980-82. Overall, the variability in farm income was over three times
as great in the 1970's as in 1955-63.
Unstable income continues to concern particular segments of agriculture (e.g., crops, livestock) and individual farmers. A recurring problem is that too many
resources are coaxed into agricultural production during
high-price periods. However, these same resources
-land, labor, and capital-are often so immobile that
they cannot exit from agriculture when prices turn
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lower. Thus current returns to resources can be low for
long periods o f time. Table I indicates the varia bility o f
fa rm income over the past two decades, its recent
decline associated with excess capacity, and farmers' increasing reliance on off-farm incom e.

3) Price assistance primarily through limiting imports: sugar and beef.
4) P rice assistance through market ing orders: dairy
products, certain fruits, and som e vegetables.
T he econ omic and poli tical basis for commodity programs dates back to the 1920's. That decade, while
generally favorable for the nonfarm sector, was a period
of economic crisis for American agriculture. Farm
prices and incomes plummeted from the levels they had
reached only a few years previously. The first efforts at
relief brought forth a series of legislative proposals
known as McNary-Haugen Bills, none of which were
adopted. However, that decade did produce the first
federal program to improve farm prices and incomes in
the form of the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1929,
which established the Federal Farm Board and the idea
of parity .
Of all the concepts that subsequently became a part of
commodity programs, the notion of parity or a " fair
price" was the most lasting. The image of parity became
associated with higher, more stable, farm incomes. Over
the last decade, however, policy deliberations about
fa rm income have increasingly emphasized costs and
volume produced . As a result, policymakers have
moved away from parity. In its place, they have sought
prices which will at least cover production costs.
Price supports have been the federal government 's
primary instrument for stabilizing or raising prices during the past half century. Typically, such supports have
been implemented through nonrecourse loans to
farmers. These loans may be redeemed either by a cash
payment or by turning the commodity used as collateral
over to the government.
While nonrecourse loans were first set as a percentage
of parity, they are now set nearer to world market price
levels. If price supports are set above market prices,
farmers accept the loans as their prices for particular
commodities, and the government accumulates stocks .
The farme r-ow ned reserve (FOR) is another policy instrument used to stabilize commodity prices and at the
same time to help meet the nation's longer-term domestic and export needs. A product of the Food and
Agriculture Act of 1977, this measure stipulates that
feed grains and wheat be held under nonrecourse loans
for longer periods of time (3-5 years) than under regula r
nonrecourse loans. If prices rise sufficiently while grain
is in the FOR, farmer s can take advantage of those
higher prices by paying off the loans in cash . The FOR
both absorbed grains from the market and released
grains to it until early 1983 . By that time substanti al
stocks had been accumulated, in part because the FOR
was being used as the primary price support mechani sm .
USDA policymakers then chose to deliberately reduce
reserve holding through the payment-in-kind (PIK) program.
Supply control programs have been used frequently

Table 1-Net Farm Income, 1961-1982.
Farm operator
family income
Net farm operator family
from off-farm,
per farm
income from farming, per farm
Current Constant 1967 Constant /967
dollars
dollars
dollars

Year

1961-1965
1966-1970
1971 -1975
1976-1980
1981
1982

Avg.
Avg.
Avg.
Avg.

$ 3,313
4,369
9,798
9,922
12,349
9,188

$3 ,604
4, 139
6,357
4,935
4,533
3,178

$3,327
4,796
6,128
6,266
6,014
5,683

Source: United States Department of A griculture.

Evolution of Policies and Programs
Over the years the U.S. government has introduced a
number of programs designed to directly address the
problems of low returns to I:esources, price instability,
and income in agriculture. Commodity programs have
included such instruments as nonrecourse loans, production controls, direct payments to farmers, and
market orders . Domestic food distribution programs
have been developed to increase the demand for agricultural products and to provide an adequate and nutritious food supply for low income and dependent
citizens . Other programs have been created for the international market to stimulate demand through exports
and to restrict competitive imports. In the discussion
that follows, the policies and instruments in each of
these problem areas are briefly reviewed and evaluated.

Commodity Program s
The review that follows is too brief to include a
thorough discussion of each of the commodities, the
particular problems encountered by its producers, and
the government's response to these problems . However,
several points are worth noting.
First, the producers of some commodities have received relatively little assistance from public funds . Produ cers of cattle, hogs, poultry , and soybeans are notable examples . In contrast, producers of such crops as
wheat, tobacco, peanuts, and cotton have been consistent users of commodity programs.
Second, the major techniques or instruments used in
programs have varied according to commodity . These
techniques can be summarized as follows:
I) Supply controls and price supports: wheat, corn
and other feed grains, cotton, rice, peanuts, and tobacco.
2) Price assistance without supply controls: manufactured dairy products and wool.
2

since the 1930's, with the intent of bringing supplies into
balance with demand at the price support level. In a
sense, individual producers have had to view these programs as the price paid for government benefits. However, production control techniques have varied as has
their effectiveness.
The predominant technique used until the early
1960's was compulsory production control, involving
acreage allotments and marketing quotas applied to
each producer on an historical basis. With overproduction and accumulated stocks plaguing farmers due to
the ineffectiveness of this approach, the government
redirected this policy with the emergency Feed Grain
Act of 1961. A voluntary production control program
was launched, which provided incentives to persuade
producers to participate in land diversion programs.
Following the gradual expansion of this voluntary approach to most program crops during the 1960's, it was
refined to provide more operating freedom for farmers
through more current crop bases and yields and through
"set-aside" percentages for individual crops, with remaining acres to be planted to any crop.
The increased flexibility in planting coincided with
the great growth in export demand during 1970's. In
years like 1973 and 1974 when production increases
were not as great as demand increases, many policy
analysts talked openly about ending acreage adjustment
programs. Indeed, the decade of the 1970's saw little use
of such programs, although the Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 and the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 updated the legislative authority for
voluntary acreage adjustments.
The Agriculture and Food Act of 1981 did not change
the voluntary approach to production control, but it did
grant more discretionary authority to the Secretary of
Agriculture than did previous legislation. Because of
record production in 1981 and 1982 ·and reduced demand, especially in the export sector, the Secretary has
used that authority. In 1983, the benefits package of '
regular and reserve loans, deficiency payments, diversion payments, and payments-in-kind persuaded producers to retire a record amount of land from production.
Direct payments for land retirement became an important policy instrument in the Agricultural Act of
1956, although such schemes had been used intermittently since 1933. Under the 1956 Act, farmers were
paid for retiring land and committing it to a Soil Bank.
In 1973, the Agriculture and Consumer Protection
Act provided for supplementing market prices with deficiency payments whenever the former fell below predetermined target prices. These target prices were linked
to annual production costs in both the 1973 and 1977
Acts, but in the 1981 Act they were predetermined for
the 1982-1985 period. In 1983, the latest version of
direct payments was the payment-in-kind program.

Farmers received a specified amount of grain as payment for taking land out of production. This grain
could be converted into dollars on the open market or
fed to livestock.
Market segmentation has been proposed since the
1920's. The idea behind segmentation is to sell in two or
more markets at different prices. The technique . involved is one of price discrimination in which a commodity is sold at a higher pri~e in the primary market
than in the secondary market. For example, wheat that
is milled into flour might be sold at a higher price than
wheat that is exported or fed to livestock. A wellsegmented market will provide higher returns to producers than a market in which all of a commodity is sold
at a single price. However, the problem has always been
to keep markets divided into high and low price
segments and to avoid retaliation from other producers
or trading nations .
The most notable successes with two-price plans have
been in the dairy industry and in the sale of fruits and
vegetables. For milk production, markets are separated
into fluid milk and processed products, usually using a
Federal Marketing Order. Fruits and vegetables are segregated between fresh and frozen or canned markets,
again sometimes using an Order or Federal Marketing
Agreement. Producer approval through referenda is
usually required.
Though there has been no formal use of such a plan
for grains and cotton, export subsidies during the 1960's
and early 1970's provided many of the effects of a twoprice plan. The blended export credit plan (the use of interest subsidies) of the 1980's also has some of the trappings of a two-price system.

Domestic Market Expansion Programs
Food distribution programs were initiated by the
Department of Agriculture in 1933. The first program
supplied surplus food products, including meat, butter,
cheese, and flour to unemployed workers and their
families. In August 1935 an amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, known as Section 32, set
aside 30 percent of customs receipts to be used to encourage the exportation and domestic consumption of
agricultural commodities. Direct distribution of food to
schools, institutions, and needy persons continues
today.
The school lunch program is another product of the
1930's which has helped to expand the market for agricultural commodities. The federal govenrment and individual states have shared responsibility for the program.
The food stamp program was initially launched just
prior to World War II, then revived by Presidential Executive Order in 1961, and finally enacted as the Food
Stamp Act of 1964. Unlike some previous food distribution programs, the primary purpose of food stamps has
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been to improve the nutrition of underprivileged persons.
The food stamp program has become the largest
assistance program ever instituted in the United States.
In 1982 more than 20 million people received program
benefits. However, program cost, now over $11 billion
annually, appears at least temporarily to have become a
barrier to further expansion.
The Child Nutrition Act of 1966 emp hasized providing nutritious meals to children. Special milk, school
breakfasts, summer food services, and child care food
programs have all resulted from this law . In addition,
the women, infants and children (WIC) program provides nutritious foods to pregnant, postpartum, and
breastfeeding women who have inadequate incomes .
The WIC program has grown rapidly, with outlays rising from $422 million in the 1978 calendar year to an
estimated $1 billion in 1982.
In fiscal 1982, food and nutrition assistance programs
accounted for $15.5 billion of the USDA's budget.
Food stamps accounted for about 75 percent of the total
with the remainder scattered across other program
areas. By comparison, federal outlays on food programs totaled $789 million in FY 1965 and $6.8 billion
in FY 1975.
The economic effects of food and nutrition programs
and agriculture have been positive, although they cannot be easily quantified. The federal outlay on food programs has averaged about 4-5 percent of total consumer
food expenditures in recent years. One mid-1970's study
showed that half of that expenditure would not have occurred without government assistance. Another study
showed that government assistance increased expenditures for high-value food products such as meats, fruits,
and vegetables. To the extent that food purchases have
increased as the result of these programs, farm prices
and incomes have increased.

fiscal 1982, the cost of the PL-480 program amounted
to about $1 billion.
Perhaps the most important thing about PL-480 is
not what it costs but what it returns in future commercial trade and improved foreign relations. Over the
years numerous countries that have received substantial
PL-480 aid have later become major commercial
customers of the United States. These countries include
Taiwan, South Korea, Spain, and Israel.
The federal government has also promoted exports
directly. In fiscal 1982 it provided about $36 million for
this purpose. These funds were used to directly support
private commodity associations and other groups with a
strong interest in export promotion .
Periodically, the United States government has
sought to expand agricultural exports through various
export subsidy schemes. For example, in late 1982 a
blended credit program was initiated. Blended credit
combines public funds at no interest cost with loan
guarantees to the private sector.
No discussion of agricultural exports would be complete without acknowledging that governmental action
has sometimes reduced exports. During the 1970's, the
government interrupted the normal flow of agricultural
exports to protect domestic supplies on at least three
occasions . In 1980, sales of grain to the Soviet Union
were halted for foreign policy purposes. In each instance farm commodity exports have been disrupted
and prices depressed, although it admittedly is impossible to measure the extent of the loss. As a result of these
policies, both the 1977 and 1981 Acts included protective provisions for American farmers in the event future
embargoes are imposed.
Finally, U.S. policy has restricted certain agricultural
imports through quotas and tariffs for many years. The
legislative authority for limiting imports is a 1935
amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1933, known as Section 22 . Such restrictions now exist
for dairy products, peanuts, sugar, and beef. While they
are intended to protect the price of affected commodities, these restrictions can also be seen as inconsistent
with efforts to expand exports.

Trade Issues and Policies

-

In recent years agricultural exports have accounted
for the production from 30 percent or more of U.S.
cropland acres. The United States is one of the few
countries in the world where most trade is the responsibility of the private sector. Still, general governmental
policy with respect to such matters as foreign relations,
national security, GATT negotiatons, currency exchange rates, and trade subsidies or restrictions can affect agricultural exports. Several specific governmental
actions have also increased the demand for agricultural
products or restricted their importation.
The Agricultural Trade, Development and Assistance
Act of 1954, better known as PL-480, is perhaps the
most significant agricultural trade legislation of the last
50 years. PL-480 currently provides for selling products
on the basis of long-term credit and for emergency relief
through governmental and voluntary relief agencies. In

Evaluation of Programs
Economic and Political Evaluation-Public policies
for agriculture have undergone continuous evaluation.
Part of thi s evaluation has been economic in nature, the
remainder political. Political evaluation encompasses
the entire public policy development process, from the
time individuals initially perceive a problem to the point
where decisionmakers reach some sort of policy compromise. A change in a program or its abandonment
signals public disapproval, while continuing it signals
public agreement. The public' s evaluation of price and
income policy for the agricultural and food sector,
4

reaching from the Federal Farm Board of I929 to the
Agriculture and Food Act of I98I, has resulted in
signals of both approval and disapproval. However,
shifts in program emphasis can best be characterized as
incremental or evolutionary in nature.
In the I984-85 period, policymakers will be sensitive
to the recent high costs of commodity programs, the importance of international markets, and the economic
well-being of farmers and the businesses serving them.
The new law that emerges in I985 to replace the Agricultural and Food Act of 198I will reflect these concerns as
well as others that may develop right up until a new act
is signed into law.
Assessing Distributional and Other Economic Impacts
-Evaluating past farm price and income-support programs is essential for those who must make choices
about future programs. An overview of the impact of
commodity, food distribution, and trade programs on
six separate farm sectors follows .
(I) Producers-Commodity programs have at least
marginally increased prices of farm products and incomes of producers for short periods of time. However,
the rapid technical changes in farming, its competitive
nature, the capitalization of farm earnings into land
values, the inability to move resources into or out of
agriculture quickly, and the exposure of farm markets
to international trade have all combined to deny or
erode income benefits over longer periods for individual
farmers. Domestic food distribution and agricultural
trade policies have also generally supported farm producers ' incomes, although some trade interventions
have disrupted them.
Economic analyses show that the benefits of price and
income programs are generally proportional to size
(market sales) of farms. This means that those farmers
who produce the most generally receive the most absolute benefits, i.e., benefits proportionate to their size
in the market, and conversely that farmers with smaller
sales receive less benefits . Programs tend to protect the
prices and incomes of farmers as a whole vis-a-vis those
with whom they buy and sell but not to redistribute
welfare among farmers. Cash payment limits (currently
$50,000) and minimum acreage quotas per farm have
slightly tilted relative benefits away from the largest
farmer s, but these tendencies are probably counteracted
by other indirect forces associated with size. Moreover,
the payment limitation did not apply to the recent PIK
program, in which millions of dollars worth of commodities were paid to some large producers.
Knowledgeable, efficient, economical, aggressive
operators have more opportunities for expanding their
scales of operation, their incomes, and their control of
resources than do operators with the opposite characteristics . Price and income policies do not substantially
alter these advantages . If the above characteristics of
these expanding operators are also coupled with other

assets, e.g., inherited capital, their advantages are
greater and their gains faster.
The longer run consequences of the stability or security which public price and income policies provide for
the farm structure is unclear. Professionals argue that in
the presence of economic uncertainty and stress the
more efficient, knowledgeable, aggressive operators can
expand faster than other operators . However, they also
sometimes argue the opposite, that farmers expand their
operations more quickly in an environment of economic
prosperity and stability.
There is little argument, however, that during the past
three decades there has been a relentless trend toward
increasing numbers of larger commercial farms . During
this period, the flow of off-farm income has consistently grown for all sizes of farms, but particularly for the
smaller ones. For these farmers, employment opportunities off the farm are more important than price and income policies. Currently, off-farm income comprises
over 60 percent of total income for the average farm
family. In 1982, even farmers with gross sales up to
$IOO,OO earned this much or more of their net incomes
off the farm .
(2) International Trade and Interrelationships with
Domestic Policies- Throughout the history of U.S.
price and income-support programs, the effect of these
programs on agricultural trade has been an important
policy issue. Moreover, this issue has increased in significance during the past decade as the proportion of total
farm production exported grew from I5 percent to 30
percent. As long as there is no recognized international
government, trade issues must be dealt with as a part of
our national policy.
A wide range of national policies affect international
trade. At times in the past, price supports have been set
so high as to inhibit trade with other countries while export subsidies and "barter aid" have invited retaliation
from them. However, present policies for most products
support prices at or only slightly above average world
levels, use direct payments, and even out market supplies over years. These policies generally support exports that have long run competitive advantages. Exceptions have been embargoes and the continued high support of dairy products, peanuts, and sugar. Trade is also
adversely affected by import policies, including duties
and quotas generally on these same few products and to
some extent on meats.
In choosing programs, certain inexorable economic
consequences of domestic policies to trade should be
considered .
(I) Production control programs (e.g., marketing
quotas) result in less products for export. As a result,
foreign market opportunities may be forfeited . Likewise, if quantities of a product are reduced too much for
domestic cons umers, imports of this product may increase.
5

(2) Domestic price supports (e.g., nonrecourse loans)
at levels significantly above average world prices reduce
exports and increase imports.
(3) Price support s set above world prices and lack of
effective production control must often be followed by
subsidized exports and restricted imports.
(4) Direct or deficienc y payments for producers increase production and hence export volume and also
discourage imports unless other trade limits are simultaneously put into effect.
(5) Export subsidization (e.g., blended credit or food
aid) and import restrictions (e.g., dairy import quotas),
both adopted to serve domestic policy objectives, increase net agricultural exports.
(6) Finally, domestic consumer food subsidies (e.g.,
food stamps) affect trade only marginally by reducing
food available for export or increasing the markets for
imports.
Any of these program alternatives may trigger retaliatory actions. The lesson is clear. Price and income
policies in the world today are still domestically determined within each nation, but rational policymaking for
a country as agriculturally trade-oriented as the U.S.
means that major consideration must be given to the interrelationships between domestic policy and trade.

an adequate, stable, and generally efficiently-produced
food supply.
In the absence of price and income-support programs, it is likely that consumers would have periodically experienced lower prices as the "surpluses" cleared
the market. Or they might have benefitted from more
efficient production in some sectors as less efficient producers were ''driven out.'' At some point, of course, the
surviving producers might have attempted to gain collective control of the market, which would not have
been a good omen for consumers. Using such measures
as real costs, quality, quantity, and proportion of income spent to obtain food and fiber, the effects of these
policies are uncertain but they are likely to vary among
commodities. Food distribution and nutrition programs
have directly benefitted lower-income consumers while
also aiding producer prices and incomes.
(6) Treasury Costs- The cost of price and income
policies has been substantial and growing, albeit erratically (Table 2).
Table 2-Commodity Credit Corporation Price Supports and Related Expenditures, Fiscal Years 1961-1983
(in millions of dollars).

(3) Agricultural Input and Marketing Industries- The
economic well-being of farmers has generally been mirrored by the agricultural input and marketing sectors.
When farming has prospered, whether by policies or
other forces, so have agricultural businesses. A notable
exception was the dramatic effect of the 1983 PIK program. While it generally benefitted farmers, it brought
losses-even bankruptcies-to many suppliers of farm
inputs . Like farm firms, agribusinesses have decreased
in number and increased in size over the years. Commodity programs have probably stabilized agribusiness
incomes in the same way they have stabilized farmers '
incomes.
(4) Rural Communities- The economic welfare of a
rural community reflects that of both producers and
supporting agribusinesses. Thus more st ability in farm
product prices and farmer income translates to better
economic health for the communit y. Since long-term income gains from programs have been marginal, they
have provided only minimal gains to communities.
However, the rural co~munity has also been affected
by persistent economic changes in the structure and
operation of farming and its supporting bu sinesses,
changes largely unrelated to public price and income
policies.
(5) Consumers-Consumer welfare is affected by the
quality of food, it s plentifulness, and the efficiency of
its production. At times price su pports, production control, trade, and food di stribution policies have probably
directly increased food prices. But such programs, along
with income supplements, have also generally supported

Year

Major
crops*

Dairy

Othert

Total

1961-1964 Avg.
1966-1970 Avg.
1971-1975 Avg.
1976-1980 Avg.
1981
1982
1983 (Projection)

1,546
2,287
1,795
2,058
1,370
8,989
13,517

236
142
196
357
1,894
2,300
2,190

437
389
398
932
736
309
5,393

2,219
2,818
2,389
3,347
4,000
II ,598
21,100

Source: Congressional Budget Office from U.S. Department of
Agriculture data.
• Wheat, feedgrains, rice, and upland col/on.
tfncludes other commodity programs, interest, and administrati ve
and nonadministrative expenses.

Even though half of the increase in expenditures during the 1970's is due to inflation, the big increases during the 1980's are real and dramatic. They are particularly troublesome in light of rising overall budget
deficits. It is a real political concern that these large
amounts are spent directly on an economic sector that
represe nts only three percent of the population, especially when the distribution of benefits is keyed to the
volume produced. The 1981 decision to offer small inducements to crop farmers for meager supply control
explains the relatively low expenditures that year. The
subsequent escalation of costs was necessary to handle
the excessive supplies of two record crop years. The increasing reliance upon direct payments and voluntary
production controls has shifted the burden of supporting farmer incomes from consumers to taxpayers.
The fiscal impacts of domestic food aid policies rose
dramatically during the late 1960's and throughout the
1970' s, reaching $16 billion a year, but they have now
been slightly reduced.

6

Price and Income Policy Issues in the Future

publications, in rural thinking, and in official governmental pronoucements. During the past two years, this
image has reemerged with vigor.
If annual rises in farm output average near 2 percent,
while domestic population and income growth generate
I percent or less in added demand, the rapid net tradegenerated demand growth of the first half of the 1970's
would have to come back to provide a semblance of
supply-demand balance. Trade-generated demand
growth dropped to under I percent annually during the
last half of the 1970's.
Chronic excess agricultural capacity could be the
scourge of the future, but capricious weather, natural
production hazards, and slowly emerging technology
could also switch the issue to a fear of food shortage.
World economic and political forces seem able to respond quicker to food deficits than to surpluses;
similarly, period of surpluses seem to last longer. In
either case, public price and income policy is likely to be
relied upon to moderate the economic stress alternatively to producers or consumers. Such policy is probably
needed because supply and demand balanced sufficiently to avoid dramatic swings in prices seems unlikely to
emerge as the pattern of the future.
(3) Expectations of World Food Production-U.S.
commodity prices and farm incomes are likely to be
greatly affected by world conditions in the foreseeable
future. U.S. farm output, compounding at a 1.8 percent
annual rate in the post World War II period, has consistently exceeded growth in domestic population and
demand for this output generated by increased incomes.
However, world population.is likely to continue to grow
around 2 percent annually for at least a decade and rising incomes in other countries also increase food demand.
If developing countries, where 75 percent of the world
population lives, can consistently increase their food
production at least as fast as their populations and if income increases generate growth in demands for food (a
favorable world scenario), the prospects for continued
growth in demand for U.S. exports of agricultural products will be dim. U.S. agriculture would then be under
chronic price and income pressure. If, on the other
hand, growth in food production in developing countries is less than 2 percent annually, and these countries
obtain the same purchasing power (an unfavorable
world scenario), prospects for U.S. exports would be
brighter and the need for price and income policies
might be reduced. However, U.S. production,
marketing, and pricing must remain competitive,
because other large agricultural exporters-Canada,
Australia, Brazil, Argentina, EEC, and even emerging
exporters among developing countries-will also stand
ready to respond to growing world food needs.
(4) Future of World Trade Restrictions-Since adoption of the General Agreements on Trade and Tariffs

Public Policy and Private Policy-Over the past two
centuries U.S. policies for agriculture and food have
produced a highly productive system of private enterprises operating in a market system within a network of
public (governmental) working rules, guidelines, and institutions. Our unique educational and research institutions, family farm agriculture, cooperative credit network, soil conservation agencies, and market informatoin and quality control services were set up by public
policies. More recently, the various price and income
programs, as well as food programs, emerged with the
same public sanction.
Whether public price and income policies will continue depends upon the citizens' choices in view of
future economic conditions and problems.
Probable Future Problem Areas-Price and income
programs that do emerge are sure to be set up in
response to perceived public problems. Some of these
potential problem areas can be identified.
(1) Instability-After two decades of increasing
stability in farm production, farm product prices, consumer prices, and agricultural export flows, the 1970's
ushered in increasing economic instability throughout
the agricultural and food sector. This instability appears
to be propelled particularly by U.S. dependence upon
foreign markets-many dominated by their respective
governments-but also by unusual weather conditions,
farmers' reliance upon borrowed capital, unsettled
money conditions, and floating international exchange
rates.
Fluctuations in a market system can contribute useful
price signals, shift resources to better uses, and
economically reward efficient management. Yet when
market variations deteriorate to volatile instability and
extreme economic uncertainty, they result in severe investment losses to producers, idle resources, increased
costs for covering risk, and shortened planning horizons. Farmers rely increasingly on borrowed capital (its
debt to asset ratio doubled from 1950 to 1982). Furthermore, part of this debt is incurred for nonreal estate
production purposes. Hence farmers have more difficulty adjusting to instability by simply reducing their
living expenses and interruptions of their cash flow
quickly threaten their equity positions. Beginning
farmers and commercial operators experience the
greatest difficulty. If the instability appearing in the
past decade continues, producers, agribusinesses, and
consumers are likely to call upon public price and income policy for relief.
(2) Excess Productivity Capacity- Temporary or
Chronic-From the 1930's through the decade of the
1960's, bypassing the War years, an image of excess
land and labor resources prevailed. Yet in the 1970's,
this image faded and its fading was reflected in various
7

(GATT) in 1947, the prohibitive trade barriers of the
early 1930's have been reduced. Even though some trade
restrictions have persisted, often of nontariff types and
on certain agricultural products, world agricultural
trade has mushroomed twentyfold during the past
quarter century. As indicated above, world food needs
imply that there is a strong potential for expanding
trade even more. But the companion ingredients of
political stability and the propensities for moderating
trade conflicts are much less evident.
Growing frustration with nationalistic trade barriers-and in some cases, deeper political antagonisms-could conceivably lead to a serious trade war.
Such a scenario could hardly benefit American farmers.
It would result in pressure to provide additional public
assistance to agriculture. If, on the other hand, trade
barriers can be reduced, then increased U.S. exports can
relieve the pressure for new price and income policies .
Closing Observation-Whatever future price and income policies come forth as responses to these possible
problem areas, they may simply be traditional, familiar
packages of instruments slightly retuned. Alternatively,
program innovations to better ensure stable prices,
secure incomes, adequate food, reliable trade, and fiscal
responsibility, might appear. These could involve such
principles as insurance, targeting programs for particular regions, declining compensation, self-help, and
indexing. Finally, price and income policies might be
designed as "change instruments" on behalf of the
public. Such policies could be used to conserve land or
water, disperse population, improve nutrition,
redistribute income, influence structure and control of
the family farm, shift enterprises, improve environmental quality, and bring about desired trade flows.
Selective alternative farm price and income-support
policies which exemplify the range of choices follow.
(1) Gradually phasing out all support policies, payments, production controls, and trade interventions, letting domestic private market decisions determine pro-

duction, prices, incomes, and trade, with other nations
pursuing their own national policies.
(2) Supplementing the choice above only with a partially publicly subsidized national income insurance and
futures price option program designed to facilitate
private risk management by farmers.
(3) Gradually phasing out all price and income
policies except for a recourse loan program to even out
farm prices during the marketing year and a minimal
farmer owned grains reserve recourse loan program to
provide national food and trade security.'
(4) Continuing the provisions of the 1981 Act, modified by setting up a maximum grains reserve as well as a
minimum grains reserve, indexing price supports to recent multi-year market price averages, indexing target
prices to recent multi-year costs of production including
some land costs, extending payment limitations to inkind as well as monetary payments, and linking production control benefits to soil conservation performances.
(5) Replacing voluntary produ ction control with compulsory control following farmer referenda supervised
by a new national marketing board, relying more on
higher support prices instead of Treasury payments, aggressively negotiating international commodity agreements, and restricting imports to protect domestic
markets.
Choices among these and other options will be greatly
affected by future developments in likely problem areas
mentioned earlier-economic instability, excess capacity, world food production, and world agricultural
trade.
When public policies are viewed as instruments, instit utional creations, or responses to society's demands,
rather than as rigid goals, scientific norms, or embodiments of ideology, one can envision infinite possibilities for their future use . The challenge to those shaping public policy is to keep as many program options
open as possible and to be certain that the public
understands both the alternatives available and the probable consequences of these alternatives.
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